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Abstract
Nuclear Proliferation is one of the greatest challenges to international security. The
Bush administration in 2003 launched the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a US-led
international anti-proliferation coalition formed to control the spread of nuclear weapons
through interdiction. This study examines the creation of the Proliferation Security Initiative
as an international anti- proliferation force. It attempts to ascertain if the PSI as an
international anti- proliferation coalition will prove to be an effective means for managing the
spread of nuclear weapons. This thesis discusses the background of the PSI, highlighting the
steps taken in establishing such an international anti- proliferation effort and giving it the
kind of power it requires to function properly and achieve the desired result. It reviews the
benefits and successes of the initiative since its creation, identifying the challenges facing the
PSI while offering recommendations to overcome these challenges.
A close examination of the PSI reveals that it is a positive move in the battle against
weapons of mass destruction. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 is useful
in providing the legal backing the initiative needs to be effective. The PSI has recorded
success in conducting actual interdictions as well as deterring the delivery of nuclear
materials by sea. However it faces many legal and operational challenges which can hinder
the ability of the initiative to achieve its ultimate goals. If these challenges are met with
adequate improvements, the PSI will be very efficient in dealing with the threat posed by
WMD. This project is a part of a growing body of research on anti proliferation measures and
is intended to contribute positively to previously unsuccessful attempts in dealing with the
menace of nuclear proliferation.
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_____________ Chapter One _______________
Introduction
The Proliferation Security Initiative is an international anti-proliferation coalition
created by the Bush administration in response to the growing challenge posed by
weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and related materials all over the
world. This thesis attempts to ascertain if the PSI as an international anti- proliferation
coalition will prove to be an effective means for managing the spread of nuclear
weapons. It discusses the background of the PSI, analyzing the steps taken in establishing
such an international anti- proliferation effort to determine if it indeed has the kind of
power it requires to function properly and achieve the desired result. It reviews the
benefits and successes of the initiative since its creation, identifying the challenges facing
the PSI while offering recommendations to overcome these challenges.
A close examination of the PSI reveals that it is a positive move in the battle
against weapons of mass destruction. The United Nations Security Council Resolution
1540 is useful in providing the legal backing the initiative needs to be effective. The PSI
has recorded success in conducting actual interdictions as well as deterring the delivery
of nuclear materials by sea. However it faces many legal and operational challenges
which can hinder the ability of the initiative to achieve its ultimate goals. If these
challenges are met with adequate improvements, the PSI will be very efficient in dealing
with the threat posed by WMD.
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Shortly after the devastating effects of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, Robert J.
Oppenheimer, author of „International Control of Atomic Energy in the Nuclear Age‟
envisaged the quest for nuclear power capabilities among the various nations of the world
over the years. Oppenheimer foresaw an intense struggle among states to achieve and
maintain superiority in the field of atomic weapons but advised however that this
situation should not be allowed to be a source of war.1 What may have been considered
an author‟s imagination more than half a century ago seems to have come true today as
more and more states seek the knowledge to develop nuclear ability.
For more than three decades after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, there were only five
legal nuclear powers namely; the United States, the Soviet Union , Britain, France and
China. Israel was thought to have secretly obtained nuclear weapons in the late 1960s.
India detonated a single nuclear device in 1974 but conducted no further tests until 1998
when Pakistan followed suit with similar tests. Records show that South Africa acquired
nuclear materials in the mid 1970s. Other developing nations such as Argentina, Brazil,
Iraq, and Libya may have taken huge steps at one time or the other to develop the
capability to manufacture nuclear weapons. North Korea has been identified as one of the
leading exporters of missile technology to Iran, Egypt, and other parts of the Middle East.
The demise of the Soviet Union introduced four new members viz; Russia, Ukraine,
Belarus, and Kazakhstan that inherited portions of the former Soviet nuclear arsenal.
The possibility of the use of nuclear weapons and of the damage that such
weapons would cause calls for the need to devote extra effort in preventing their
proliferation and use. At present, the United States in particular believes that there would
1

Hall, Gardner, “American Global Strategy and the War on Terrorism”. Hampshire, Burlington: (Ash gate
Publishing Company), 2005. p. ix.
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be reason enough to worry about nuclear accidents in new member states even if their
safety difficulties were only as great as those experienced by old nuclear powers.2 This is
due to the fact that emergent nuclear powers cannot boast of the organization and
financial resources to complement their efforts with adequate mechanical safety devices
and safe weapons design features.
Nuclear materials in the hands of non-state actors constitute as much danger to the
world community. The 2003 interception of nuclear materials bound for Libya exposed
the illicit international nuclear black marketing network managed by the Pakistani
scientist, Abdal -Qadeer Khan. The exposure of the Khan network has in turn increased
the fear that WMD if unchecked could also fall into the hands of terrorist organizations
such as Al Qaeda who will not hesitate to use them. There is reason to be apprehensive of
the effects of nuclear proliferation given the fact that there is really no effective system in
place to guard against theft of nuclear materials, illicit or non-peaceful use of them and
illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials across international borders.
In recognition of the threat posed by WMD, President George W. Bush launched
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), an international anti-proliferation alliance to
interdict weapons of mass destruction and related delivery systems via sea, air and land.
The PSI represents both a multilateral approach and heightened effort to disrupt the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related materials.3. The PSI served as a
complement to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 which calls on member

2

Scott D. Sagan, and Kenneth N. Waltz, „The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed‟ (New
York: W.W. Norton and Company Inc.), 2003. P. 77.
3
Hwang Y . Balbina, “Curtailing North Korea‟s Illicit Activities”, Backgrounder, The Heritage Foundation
(August, 2003), p.1. Online: www.heritage.org/research/asiaandthepacific/bg/1679.cfm. Accessed Dec 6,
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states of the UN to recognize that all WMD constitutes a threat to international peace and
security and to join forces together to prevent proliferation.
Olivia Bosch and Peter Van Ham recognize nuclear proliferation and terrorism as
“a threat of global significance instead of a country or region-specific menace”4. The
authors described the UNSCR 1540 meant to address these threats as “an exceptional
multilateral response to an exceptional multifaceted security challenge …and undertook
to fill important gaps in existing non-proliferation treaties and multilateral arrangements
which do not currently capture the role of non-state actors in matters related to WMD”.5
According to the authors, although Resolution 1540 gives the Security Council a more
concrete mission and mandate in the area of non- and counter-proliferation it remains to
be seen how the Resolution‟s provisions will be made operational and enforced.6 They
concluded, therefore, that since ”states have widely varying capacities for implementing
and enforcing the Resolution, it is they, not the Security Council, that must take
appropriate action in accordance with their national capabilities and legislative
framework”7 Bosch and Ham thus places the burden of implementing UNSCR 1540 on
states in which case the US –led PSI becomes a step in the right direction.
James Doyle discusses the technologies and processes for the protection, control
and accounting of nuclear material, detecting proliferation and verifying the elimination
of nuclear weapons program. He argues that “many nations have nuclear materials
security and export control systems that require significant improvement to effectively
4

Olivia, Bosch, and Peter Van Ham, “Global Non-Proliferation and Counter Terrorism” (London,
Washington D.C: Brookings Institutions Press), 2007. p. ix
5

Ibid, p. ix.
Ibid, p.20
7
Ibid, p.20
6
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prevent illegal loss or trafficking of nuclear materials.” 8 He also believes in the need to
create a comprehensive safeguards system to prevent nuclear terrorism and illicit nuclear
trade. Like Bosch and Ham, Doyle agrees that “the IAEA has limited resources and
political authority to address these shortcomings and so perceive the UN Security Council
resolution 1540 and the Proliferation Security Initiative as encouraging international
developments even though their full implementation is uncertain”.9 Doyle infers that
there is clearly a need for continuous, vigorous efforts to improve the technological and
human capital that managing nuclear security will require.”10
James Russell assesses the problematic cases of proliferation in the Middle East
analyzing current and potential problems in Libya, Syria, Iran and the potential for
proliferation in Saudi Arabia. Russell also places the Israeli nuclear program within the
context of regional dynamics identifying it as one of several factors driving regional
proliferation. Russell proceeds to form counter-proliferation choices for the US by
assessing lessons to be learnt from Libya and Iraq as well as the challenges facing the
international community in Iran. In closing his argument, Russell contends that “in an age
of new threats, revolutionary technologies… where earlier policies no longer retain their
potency… we must devise new ways, new organizations including new force packages
and new thinking to rebuff those threats”11Russell‟s assertion supports Bosch and Ham
and Doyle‟s position on the need to adapt new approaches to counter proliferation

8

James, Doyle, “Nuclear Safeguards, Security and Non- Proliferation: Achieving Security with
Technology and Policy”. (New York, San Francisco: Elsevier Inc, 2008), p.13.
9

Ibid p.13.
Ibid p.13.
11
James, Russell, “Proliferation of Weapons of Mass destruction in the Middle East: Directions and Policy
Options in the New Century”. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p.23.
10
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especially in the Middle East where there exist many incentives to proliferate.
Mark R. Shulman explains the value of an important new security initiative with
considerable implications for the use of force in operations other than war. He argues that
the PSI is changing long held international norms about the conditions for the use of
force to ensure strategic objectives. According to Shulman, the PSI will help to
breakdown some of the obstacles that presently prevent the US and its allies from using
targeted military missions to achieve critical security objectives without triggering a state
of war. In conclusion, Shulman conceives that “the initiative can play an important role in
helping staunch the dangerous proliferation of WMD, and the means to create and deliver
them…through interdiction or raising the cost above what some terrorists can afford to
pay. It can also help reform the international security system by making it more flexible
and responsive to the challenges of the twenty –first century.”12 While the previous
authors cited, Bosch and Ham, Doyle and Russell mostly drew attention to the
incompetence of the existing nonproliferation regimes and underscores the need to adapt
a new approach to the proliferation problem, hence the endorsement of the PSI, Shulman
takes the argument a step forward by looking at the implications for using interdiction
without provoking war among nations.
Finally, Herbert Warden identifies several challenges the PSI is inclined to
contend with. These he classifies into intelligence, legal and operational challenges.
Warden lays emphasis on the importance of reliable intelligence, bringing “the PSI under

12

Mark, Shulman, “The Proliferation Security Initiative as a New Paradigm for Peace and Security”.
Army War College, (April 2006), p.39.

7
the auspices of an internationally recognized justification, such as a PSI-specific UN
Security Council resolution (UNSCR)”13 and also cites problems with alliance or
coalition operations, detection and use of force. He concludes that “when intelligence is
reliable and legal justification available, PSI operations are expected to be successful” 14
Warden‟s distinction between using the PSI as diplomacy on the one hand and as
interdiction on the other hand is very interesting. Warden submits that by building
international support, PSI is applying diplomacy to stop the flow of WMD to rogue states and non-state actors while “the threat that a shipment may be seized in an
interdiction process should act as a deterrent to potential proliferators.”15Warden‟s
analysis is similar to Shulman‟s because the former attempted to explore the pros and
cons of interdiction just like Shulman tried to weigh the implications for the use of force
without evoking war.
The significant growth in nuclear proliferation over the years proves that
determined proliferators exist. It also suggests that counter proliferation measures
adopted so far will not contain the spread of WMD. Rogue states will continue to take
undue advantage of the pitfalls existing in the nonproliferation regimes to evade
international commitments. There is a pressing need to be more resolute in controlling
WMD to avoid future nuclear disaster. The PSI is a bold and decisive approach to dealing
with the trafficking of WMD but its success depends on its ability to balance important
security interests with complex domestic and international legal considerations in a way
that protects vital national interests.
13

Warden, Herbert, “Overcoming Challenges to the Proliferation Security Initiative,” Naval Post
Graduate School, (Sept 2004), p.38.
14
15

Ibid, p76.
Ibid, p.13
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_________________ Chapter Two __________________
Background of the PSI
Overview of Nuclear Proliferation
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was set up by a resolution of
the United Nations in 1957. Since its foundation, the IAEA has promoted sometimes
contradictory missions. The agency seeks to promote and spread the use of civilian
energy while seeking to prevent or detect, the diversion of civilian energy to nuclear
weapons, nuclear explosive devices and for other purposes that could not be verified. In
order to carry out the above task, the IAEA introduced a safeguards arrangement
incorporated into the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968. This treaty aims
to ensure that civil stocks of uranium, plutonium, as well as facilities and technologies
associated with these nuclear materials are used only for peaceful purposes and do not
contribute in any way to proliferation or a nuclear weapons program.
The 1968 NPT officially recognized five states as possessing nuclear weapons.
These states include the US (1945), Soviet Union (1949, the UK (1952), France (1960)
and China (1964). Even though there has been no war between these five nuclear powers
also tagged nuclear-weapon states, the nuclear future seems to be more uncertain and
potentially more dangerous as fissile material, nuclear weapons technology and
information, scientific experience and industrial capacity spread to nations which are not
recognized as „nuclear weapon states‟ by the NPT. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
which opened for signature in July 1968 became the most widely accepted arms control
agreement but 40 years after its initiation, appeared to be inadequate in controlling the
spread of nuclear weapons. A provision of the NPT allows all signatory states to develop

9
research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discriminating. A
critical mind might be inclined to think that by giving all states the right to develop their
own nuclear power plants, the treaty in effect opens the way to proliferation since any
nuclear reactor that has enough centrifuges can enrich uranium to weapons level
At present, the NPT has been ratified by 188 sovereign states including the
original five nuclear weapon states earlier cited. However, there are three nations namely;
India, Pakistan and Israel none of which signed or ratified the NPT but have acquired or
are suspected to have acquired nuclear weapons. As such, they are being looked upon as
defiant nuclear powers by the nuclear weapon states and their possession of nuclear
weapons seen as illegitimate. Israel has not publicly conducted a nuclear test and does not
necessarily admit or deny having nuclear weapons but is widely believed to possess
nuclear arms. India claiming its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes first tested a
nuclear explosive device in 1974. Both India and Pakistan demonstrated their nuclear
weapons ability with a round of tests in May 1998 apparently to deter each other. The
fact that these nations cannot be forced to sign the NPT on one hand and their
noncompliance on the other hand suggest that their nuclear weapons programs cannot be
brought under the scope of safeguards stipulated by the NPT. It is not hard to see,
therefore, that these nations could easily transfer nuclear weapons technology at will
without being dictated. Even when dictated, their non membership of the NPT
emasculates the ability to enforce appropriate sanctions under the provisions of the NPT.
In the past two decades, North Korea, Iran and Iraq have received even greater
attention from the US in terms of states alleged to or actually undertaking an active
nuclear weapons program. North Korea is the only signatory that has resigned from the
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NPT and after a series of futile negotiations announced in January of 2005 that it was in
possession of nuclear weapons. North Korea is presumed to have exploded a nuclear
device underground in 2006. In early 2007, North Korea agreed to halt its weapons
program in exchange for shipments of fuel oil but that was a promise Pyongyang never
kept. On May 25th of this year, North Korea insisted it has a right to nuclear weapons and
“announced that it has staged a successful underground nuclear test…more powerful than
the previous one in October 2006.”16 This nuclear explosion was confirmed by geological
agencies in South Korea, the US and Russia respectively. The tests conducted this year,
the most recent of a series of repeated violations by Pyongyang defies the earlier
agreement to halt its weapons program in exchange for shipments of fuel oil. The recent
attempt to intercept a North Korean Ship, Kam Nam, suspected to be carrying nuclear
material in violation of UN sanctions further sheds light on North Korea‟s motives. There
seems to be no peaceful solution yet to address North Korea‟s nuclear ambition. As long
as it maintains its status as a withdrawn NPT member, monitoring its nuclear activities
appears quite improbable.
President Ahmadinejad of Iran has made statements about wiping Israel off from
the map, a threat considered disturbing to the international community. He however,
claims that Iran‟s nuclear program is only for peaceful energy purposes and that Iran is
just being falsely accused of trying to build a nuclear arsenal. Western suspicions of
Iran‟s intentions grew out of its secrecy, its determination to enrich uranium and its
efforts to be a dominant force in the Middle East. UN inspections in Iraq after the Gulf

16

DPRK authorities on a state radio read out an official communiqué stating that another round of nuclear
testing had been “successfully conducted…as part of measures to enhance the Republic‟s self-defensive
nuclear deterrent in all directions” See “North Korea Conducts Nuclear Tests” at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8066615.stm. Accessed, June2, 2009.
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War had revealed the scope of its clandestine weapons program. As an NPT signatory,
Iraq agreed to place its nuclear material under UN safeguards but further inspections
disclosed extensive secret uranium enrichment and a nuclear weapons design program at
the time. Iraq‟s nuclear weapons program is one of the reasons adduced by the Bush
administration for the recent US invasion of the Arab nation. Even after the invasion, the
safety and control of nuclear related-material, dual-use equipment, nuclear sites and more
appear to be worrisome. It is also important to mention cursorily in assessing the
dimensions of nuclear proliferation and its attendant threat that tons of poorly guarded
nuclear material stockpiled in the old Soviet Union makes the prospects of mischief with
stolen nuclear materials as dangerous as a big nuclear bomb.
In October of 2003, the American, UK, German and Italian governments
cooperated to arrange the diversion of a shipment of centrifuge components bound for
Libya. These components have been secretly purchased in the international nuclear black
market from the illicit Pakistani-based nuclear smuggling network headed by Abdal Qadeer Khan. This incident exposed Libya‟s secret nuclear weapons program, and got a
closer investigation of the Khan network which disclosed that the network had between
1989 and 2000 provided expertise to Iran, Libya and North Korea even as Khan himself
attested to. Khan‟s network came to be described not only as the largest known
international nuclear black marketing network but also as one of the greatest threats to
international security. The 2003 interception of nuclear material bound for Libya
eventually led to the termination of Libya‟s nuclear weapons program as well as the
demise of the Khan network.
In further expounding the scope of nuclear proliferation and the threat that it
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poses, the danger of a terrorist nuclear attack by a rogue group or non-state actor need not
be understated. While it is possible to deter a state, it is quite hard to deter terrorist
organizations if they lay their hands on nuclear weapons. States may be controlled by
economic sanctions, IAEA provisions and other strict regulations to restrain them from
seeking to misuse nuclear technology all of which are unenforceable towards a terrorist
organization. Although nuclear proliferation seems to grow, experts state that a full-scale
nuclear attack is less likely than a small scale “suitcase bomb” or similar device. Bunn
asserts however, that even a one percent chance of nuclear terrorism over the next ten
years would be enough to justify substantial action to reduce the risk, given the
unimaginable consequences.17
The fact that Bin Laden may not have acquired nuclear weapons should not
suggest that he and other terrorists are not trying to or that international preventive
measures have successfully hindered their attempts. The US Department of Homeland
Security as of April 2008 believes that Al Qaeda “is intent on attacking the United States
with a nuclear weapon but has not developed a nuclear device.”18 Presently, no one
knows for sure what the current status of Al Qaeda‟s nuclear effort is, so there are
chances it could acquire the raw materials needed to produce a crude but deadly nuclear
bomb.19 It may not be too shocking to hear that Bin Laden surprised the US with a
nuclear bomb attack having remained highly elusive since the 9/11 terrorist attacks

17

Stuart Gottlieb, “Debating terrorism and Counterterrorism: Conflicting Perspectives on Causes, Contexts
& Responses”,(Washington D.C: CQ Press, 2009), p.179.
18
Charles Allen , Chief intelligence officer for the Homeland Security Department and Roff MowattLarssen, Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Energy Department based on
a discussion of classified material testified before the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs
Committee about Al Qaeda‟s nuclear threat. They called on a global effort to get nuclear materials off the
black market. See Michael Posner “Intelligence officers call Al Qaeda Nuclear Threat Real” at
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0308/040208cdpml.htm. Accessed June 4, 2009.
19
See Gottlieb, “Debating terrorism and Counterterrorism”, p.175.
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despite frantic efforts by the US to haunt him down or monitor his nefarious activities.
The ultimate goal of the NPT is to get the non-nuclear weapon states not to
develop a weapons program and to get the nuclear weapon states to adopt effective
measures to reduce their arsenals, terminate the nuclear arm race, and pursue complete
disarmament under strict and effective international control. As with all rules however,
implementation is the crux of the matter. Pitfalls that may hinder progress that otherwise
could have been made towards checking the spread of nuclear weapons have been
identified in the NPT. For instance, the treaty is not binding on Israel, Pakistan and India
all of which possess nuclear weapons but have not signed the treaty. In other words, these
three nations are not considered nuclear weapon states by the NPT in the sense that it
recognized the five original nuclear weapon states while these nations actually possess
nuclear weapons.
North Korea signed the treaty in 1985 but withdrew without any serious reprisal
from the IAEA. There have been sanctions on North Korea but none of these sanctions
could be directly associated with its withdrawal form the NPT. As a matter of fact, there
is no provision in the NPT that explicitly outlined appropriate sanctions to be enforced
against any member state that exits the treaty at will or in pursuit of selfish interests.
According to Charles Ferguson, a specialist in disarmament and WMD, “the NPT regime
is flawed in the sense that it calls for eventual disarmament on the part of the nuclear
states without any time bound commitment given the indefinite extension of the treaty at
the 1995 NPT review conference. He also pointed out the lack of adequate enforcement
mechanism on the part of the IAEA to ensure compliance.”20 For him, the power of the

20

CQ Global Researcher “Nuclear Proliferation: Is a New Nuclear Arms Race Beginning?” Vol.1 #1 (Jan
2007), p.7. Online: www.globalreseacher.com Accessed June4, 2009.
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IAEA is simply limited to more of making inspections.
The Model Additional Protocol is a program initiated in 1997 by the IAEA to
strengthen and extend the classical safeguards system. It boosted the IAEA‟s ability to
detect undeclared nuclear activities including those with no connection to the civil fuel
cycle. As of October of 2008, while 127 countries have signed the Additional Protocol
and 88 have brought it into force, many others have not. Egypt for instance refused to
sign it until Israel accepts comprehensive IAEA safeguards. Brazil opposes making the
protocol a requirement for international cooperation on enrichment and reprocessing but
has not given a final world about its position. It is quite obvious that the problem of
nuclear proliferation or eventual disarmament is far from being achieved. It is hard to
convince some countries of the futility of WMD when it seems all holders insist on
keeping them. Simply put, concrete steps ought to be taken to add impetus to the effort to
check proliferation since it appears total disarmament at this point looks unrealistic.

The Proliferation Security Initiative
In May 2003, President George W. Bush divulged America‟s intention to lead a
new effort, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) devised to create international
agreements and partnerships that would allow the US and its allies search planes and
ships suspected to be carrying weapons of missile technology and seizing such weapons.
The Proliferation Security Initiative addresses the need for a more dynamic, active
approach to the global proliferation problem. It is a partnership of states working
together, using their national capabilities to develop a broad range of legal, economic,
military and other tools to interdict shipments of WMD and other goods of such nature to
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terrorists and countries of proliferation concern. The PSI discourages the pursuit of
nuclear weapons and makes it more costly and risky for proliferators to acquire the
weapons or materials that will aid the production of nuclear weapons or get nations who
do so to experience significant delays in the efforts to acquire nuclear capability.
The Bush administration linked the PSI to United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1540. The UNSCR 1540 could be traced back to Sept 2003 when President
Bush in a proposal to the UN General Assembly explained the new PSI briefly and
requested that the “…Security Council adopt a new anti-proliferation resolution that
should call on all members of the UN to criminalize the proliferation of WMD, to enact
strict export controls consistent with international standards, and to secure any and all
sensitive materials within their borders. The US stands ready to help any nation draft
these new laws, and to assist their enforcement.”21
The UN Security Council on April 28, 2004 unanimously passed Resolution 1540
basing its authority on Chapter VII of the 1945 Charter.22 The UNSCR 1540 primarily
requires all states to “refrain from providing any form of support to non-state actors that
attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use WMD and
their means of delivery,…adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibits
any non-state actor to …use WMD in particular for terrorist purposes…and take and
21

Bosch, Olivia, and Peter Van Ham, “Global Non-Proliferation and Counter Terrorism” (London,
Washington D.C: Brookings Institutions Press, 2007), p.6.

22

Chapter VII of the UN Charter states that “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide
what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international
peace and security.” See Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII, Article 39, Online:
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter 7.shtml. Accessed Aug,1, 2009.
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enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of
WMD…by developing security, physical protection, border and export controls”23
Resolution 1540 tried to address the inadequacies of the existing measures and the
particular challenge of WMD proliferation by non-state actors in its mandate. It imposed
a baseline of extensive appropriate effective anti proliferation obligations and required all
states to enact and enforce these measures promptly. In creating the PSI, the Bush
administration thus took full advantage of the UNSCR 1540 as a foundation upon which
to move toward an effective international nonproliferation strategy addressing all
weapons of mass destruction
According to statistics from the Arms Control Association, 10 countries originally
joined the United States to shape and promote the initiative. The association further
claims that an additional 73 countries including Russia have publicly committed to the
initiative while a nation like China has expressed reservations regarding the legality of
interdictions. PSI participants in a press statement portrayed it as an activity and not an
organization which may further account for the Chinese hesitation to join. Washington‟s
move to assemble coalitions to address international problems seem more promising than
embarking on building new multinational institutions when the existing ones tend to be
ineffective
The PSI hence seems to be a logical response to the menace of nuclear
proliferation. It has achieved reasonable success both in the operational and diplomatic
fronts. At the operational level, interdiction has no doubt put pressure on all actors intent
on transferring weapon related goods. PSI operations obviously increase the transaction
costs of illicit transfers while simultaneously threatening to expose the parties involved
23
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and by so doing serve as a deterrent to proliferation. In the diplomatic front, it has
strengthened non-proliferation cooperation by securing the support and commitment of
several nations to work together as well as developed legal instruments to control
weapons traffic on land, in the air and at sea.
Despite these gains associated with the formation of the PSI, there are also
potential obstacles to the success of the PSI. Notable among these impediments is the
secret nature of PSI operations which obscures objective assessment of the initiative‟s
performance. Associating the PSI directly with the United Nations Security Council
Resolution (UNSCR 1540) has not completely erased questions regarding legitimacy of
interdictions which in turn has negatively influenced full participation or resulted in nonparticipation of certain nations, for example, China. There are also operational challenges
such as related to matters of intelligence i.e reliability of information, language barriers,
availability of resources and more.
In order to be more effective the PSI needs to increase the number of the present
participating countries. Its operations must conform to provisions of international law to
address concerns regarding its legitimacy There is also need to overhaul its current
framework, improve intelligence gathering capabilities and provide sufficient funding to
carry out its goals. .Taken together, the gains and challenges of the PSI clearly
demonstrate the initiative represents both a high-level political and military effort to
address the danger posed by proliferation of WMD. With appropriate reformation, the
PSI will surely stand the test of time.
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Legitimacy of the Proliferation Security Initiative
The effectiveness of PSI as an international anti-proliferation coalition to a large
extent depends on the support and cooperation of other states. This much needed nonproliferation cooperation can only be achieved if PSI is perceived as a legitimate
collective response to the re-defined threat of weapons proliferation by those nations
whose support is being solicited. It is important to note that in addition to America‟s
primary goal to address the threat of WMD to international peace and security, the PSI
evolved out of the Bush‟s administration frustration over a December 2002 incident with
a North Korean cargo ship. Spanish forces, in cooperation with the US, stopped a North
Korean shipment of short-range ballistic missiles but ended up letting the ship go because
they lacked the legal rationale for confiscating the missiles. Besides, the Middle Eastern
nation, Yemen, supposedly the missile buyer, that Washington sees as an important
country in its war on terrorism complained persistently.
This scenario draws attention to the question of legitimacy as far as the creation of
the PSI is concerned and which in turn either fosters or diminishes the much needed
cooperation of other states. If other nations perceive the initiative as a legal non
proliferation tool, the tendency for them to pledge their commitment and support but if
they envision it as a move that implicitly grants the US unwarranted powers to act as a
global police force, then there exists even a greater tendency to withhold their
commitment and support. Some argue that Resolution 1540 establishes the base of a new
system of universal approach towards addressing the nexus of WMD, proliferation,
terrorism and illicit trafficking. Prior to the advent of Resolution 1540, UN member states
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through protracted and fruitless debates and negotiations attempt to reach a consensus on
common standards and norms to effectively control the spread of WMD. Hence
Resolution 1540 was intended to affect all states domestic legal structures compelling
each country to commit not only to criminalize WMD proliferation by non-state actors
but also apply effective controls. Bosch and Ham presuppose that” the strategic
imperative of the post 9/11 security environment has dictated a swifter and less
consensual model. Which can be seen as among the outer-tiers of a layered nonproliferation defense and which is in line with the United States international security
agenda”24
In the move to advance the resolution, the under-institutionalized structure of the
UNSCR 1540 system supports America‟s desire to avoid new bureaucracy thereby
engendering swift and very likely, effective measures in a system that may allow it
significant influence. In other words, the US hopes that the long process of unproductive
debates and negotiations among states would be replaced by a quicker, more dynamic and
practical system. UNSCR 1540 in the eyes of Washington represents effective
multilateralism. The PSI and the Container Security Initiative refer to proactive steps
towards this while at the same time seeking to reinforce the role of the Nuclear Suppliers
Group in monitoring nuclear exports. The US thinks that there is limited time compared
to the magnitude of threat that WMD especially in the wrong hands poses. As a result,
creating a new system that is not devoid of a headquarters, a secretary general, talk-fests,
endless legal seminars, may be French or Russian veto and other formal institutional
features only serve to retard the capability of dealing with a dangerous situation.
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The British American Security Information Council (BASIC) believes that
America‟s position vilifies international agreements and institutions. It contends that the
US perceives these multilateral meetings as valueless and only serve to inhibit America‟s
propensity to act decisively. The idea thus is to replace these international forums with
more resourceful US methods and to shift focus from treaties to direct action that would
eliminate regimes that had weapons. Washington therefore calls for a policy of
multilateralism by inviting others to partner with the US, with implicit trust for its
leadership and judgment. Thus such terms as the “the coalition of the willing” has been
used to describe this new form of multilateralism. Shulman noted that “the PSI represents
a prominent example of the administrations thinking about how to build transnational
support to protect American interests. It envisions a new kind of multilateral security
arrangement - one with considerable advantages over the heavily negotiated and thus
cumbersome treaties to which lawyers and diplomats have grown accustomed”.25
Given the provisions of the UNSCR 1540 from its formative stages to when it was
eventually passed eight months later, there is no doubt that President Bush evidently tied
the PSI to Resolution 1540. According to Shulman, “in the light of the importance of the
issues addressed, the level of public scrutiny involved, the legal novelty of UN Security
Council Resolution 1540, it seems fair enough to conclude that the Security Council was
endorsing the PSI”.26 On this basis, the legitimacy of the PSI should, therefore, never be
in question, nevertheless, critics of the initiative resiliently differ in their opinion They
maintained that much of the PSI‟s innovativeness has been associated with its operational
25
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aim to intercept land, sea, and air-based WMD transfers, an approach in their opinion
fraught with many legal hurdles. Some of the legal implications of interdictions will be
discussed after assessing how the initiative has fared in the past few years especially in
relation to the interdiction process.
Shortly after President George W. Bush first announced the initiative in Krakow,
Poland, on May 31, 2003, the US along with 10 other states namely Australia, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the United kingdom
signed a statement of Principles. The PSI became in December 2003, a 16-country
coalition with the addition of Singapore, Denmark, Norway, Canada and Turkey who
also agreed to a politically binding “Statement of Interdiction Principles”. According to
the State Department, at least 90 countries support the PSI presently and about 81 have
participated in PSI meetings or exercises.
This propensity indeed suggests a growing list of nations willing to associate
themselves with different aspects of the PSI. Nonetheless, the concerns of those
countries, for instance, China, that prefer to keep its distance from the initiative appear to
be more worrisome than the professed support of 90 countries which cannot be
convincingly substantiated. While China questions the legality of interdictions arguing
that the United States should seek specific backing for the initiative under international
law, PSI participants express that several measures already provide such a legal base
alluding to “UN Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 1718, amendments to relevant
international maritime convention, a series of ship boarding agreements and the right to
self –defense under the UN Charter”.27
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Countdown of PSI Successes and Benefits
Although the Proliferation Security Initiative is only six years old, PSI
participants believe that the Initiative has already reached several important milestones.
The US Department of Defense asserts that it has enhanced international cooperation to
impede and stop the trafficking of WMD thereby reducing the threat posed by
proliferation. In terms of executing operations, the Defense Department also reaffirms
that the PSI has conducted interdictions that have halted proliferation -related shipments.
The US government has drawn attention to four instances where dangerous goods were
stopped from arriving proliferation destination. Two of such cases involved missile and
nuclear-related cargo destined for Iran, while Syria was the intended recipient of missile
related goods in the other two examples.
The first instance took place in February of 2005 when “the US allegedly tipped
off an European government that one of its national entities was at the verge of shipping
coolers to Iran that may be used in the latter‟s heavy- water reactor program. Heavy –
water reactors have served as a key source of plutonium in the nuclear bomb efforts of
India, Israel and Pakistan. The European government investigated the claim and denied
an export license for the coolers in accordance with a national law controlling such
exports to Iran”.28 It has been adjudged that, “the heavy –water research reactor under
construction…if combined with reprocessing capabilities, would provide Iran
with….plutonium for a potential weapons program”.29 In November of 2006 it was
believed that “the transfer of chromium-nickel steel plates to Iran by an Asian company
28
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was stopped in a third country. The steel plates which reportedly could be used in missile
components were returned to the original supplier country. The interdicting state acted in
accordance with UN Security Resolution1696 that calls on all states to prevent transfers
of items to Iran that may enhance its ballistic missile program”.30
In April of 2007, “a shipment of sodium perchlorate to Iran from an unspecified
source was detoured to an Asian port whose government then sent the shipment back to
the country of origin. The sodium perchlorate can be used in making solid rocket
propellant for ballistic missiles and was intended for an Iranian entity barred from
receiving missile technologies by UN Security Council Resolution 1737.”31 In June of
2007, an unspecified country denied over-flight rights to a Syrian plane scheduled to
make a round trip flight to North Korea. This denial was as a result of the US sharing
suspicions that the intended cargo was connected to ballistic missiles. UNSCR 1718
requires all countries to cooperate in preventing transfers of ballistic missiles and related
technologies from North Korea. The Syrian flight did not occur.”32
These specific incidents attest to increasing capabilities on the part of PSI. This
claim is further substantiated by US officials who opine that the PSI has achieved even
more. According to them, though successfully halting the transfer of these dangerous
materials in the cases outlined above seems appealing, these operations may not be an
accurate yardstick for measuring the value of the PSI. They submitted that the initiative‟s
worth is more evident in what they described as the growing individual and collective
capabilities of participants to curb proliferation. They cited such examples as the eight
bilateral ship boarding agreements that the US has negotiated with other governments.
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The agreements establish timely methods to allow searches of suspicious ships under
those states legal authority. The US claims that 35 interdiction exercises involving more
than 70 countries lend credence to the presumed success of the initiative. It is essential to
point out that exercises and other PSI operational aspects are determined by the
Operational Experts Group (OEG) comprised of 20 states, including the capture of the
BBC China supposedly carrying centrifuge parts to Libya in December of 2003 This
group meets three to four times annually “to discuss relevant PSI implementation
issues… and the latest meeting of the OEG was held in Paris, France, September 24-26,
2008.” 33
In reviewing the performance of the initiative nearly six years after its launch, the
proliferation situation appears to have changed albeit not explosively. Proponents of PSI
argue that the menace of proliferation has reduced. There is intensified surveillance over
countries of proliferation concern and non- state groups that are likely to engage in WMD
proliferation. The first and probably the most celebrated of successful interdictions of the
PSI is the capture of the BBC China supposedly carrying centrifuge parts to Libya in
December of 2003. This incident was stated as seizure that had a major role in Libya‟s
decision to give up the pursuit of WMD. In May 2005, then Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice maintained that in the last 9 months, PSI partners have cooperated on
11 successful efforts. Erstwhile Under Secretary Robert Joseph averred that there were
over 30 successful US operations citing one more recent example in February of 2007,
when four nations worked together to interdict missile related equipment bound for Syria.
In June of this year, tension mounted as a US Navy Destroyer positioned itself
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and awaited orders to intercept off the coast of China a North Korean ship, Kam Nam,
perceived to be carrying weaponry, missile parts or nuclear materials. The Kam Nam is
suspected of proliferating materials in violation of UN sanctions meant as a reprisal for
nuclear tests North Korea conducted the month before. The UN resolution 1874 that put
the sanctions in place does not allow the US to forcibly board the ship but request
permission which North Korea is unlikely to grant. In fact, North Korea stated “that any
attempt to board its ship would be considered an act of war and promised retaliation…”34
According to news sources “since the US does not expect to be granted
permission, it expects to be asked to interdict that it will have to shadow the ship until it
runs out of fuel. At that point, the ship would likely have to be towed into the port.”35
However, North Korea decided to call back the Kam Nam, rather than risk inspection of
its Cargo while refueling in Hong Kong or Singapore. North Korea was not willing to
allow this search take place. North Korea‟s decision to have the ship return home rather
than be boarded and searched implicitly suggests that the Kam Nam could be truly loaded
with nuclear materials. This implies that the PSI successfully deterred potential transfer
of nuclear materials.
Given the record of claims of success, the PSI and other US driven supportive
efforts have improved the awareness of the danger and urgency of the problem. The focus
on interdiction has no doubt constrained some trade in WMD, their delivery systems or
related materials, increased national capacities for coordinated detection and interdiction
34
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of suspect shipments and flag-state consent for boarding to search for weapons of mass
destruction has become an expectation for and of many states who signed boarding
agreements with the US.36 The PSI has also shifted focus on interdiction at sea to
inspection in ports, to carriage of WMD by aircraft, and for the US, to disruption of
financial networks involved or supporting such trafficking 37 The PSI therefore, may be
on target in terms of realizing its goals and objectives.
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____________ Chapter Three ____________
Challenges to the PSI
Credibility of PSI Operations
In spite of the apparent achievements of the PSI within a relatively short period
after its inception, Vinod Kumar, an Associate Fellow at the Institute for Defense Studies
and Analysis, New Delhi, argue that “one cannot credit this trend as a total success
because the initiative has been mired in controversies and systematic issues that have
hampered its proactive advancement.”38 Mark Valencia, a maritime policy analyst and
political commentator focused on Asia, asserts that “there is insufficient public
information and no objective measure of PSI success or failure. Thus it is unclear how the
much peddled 30 interdictions over the years compares to efforts prior to the initiative or
if an increase in successful interdictions is due to an increase in proliferation activity.”39
According to him, the overly publicized October 2003 interdiction of WMD - related
materials bound for Libya was most likely not due to the PSI, but contrary to assertions
by US officials, may have been the result of an unrelated effort to get Libya to abandon
its ambition to possess weapons of mass destruction.”40
The debate here is that because the PSI interdictions are shrouded in secrecy, an
objective evaluation of the PSI must rely on an examination of publicly available
information regarding specific claims for the PSI made by the US government and PSI
advocates because in many cases, the reality does not appear to match the rhetoric.
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Kumar further affirms that “since its launch in 2003, there have been just a handful of
declared cases of successful PSI interdictions. Instead, what has been seen in the past five
to six years are numerous plenary meetings with platitudinous declarations and an
umpteen number of military interdiction exercises among PSI participants”.41 US
officials outlined a number of successes for the initiative, including international
exercises as well as increasing number of signatories during the fifth anniversary of the
PSI but refused to go into details about how many actual interdictions have happened so
far. Under secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, John Rood, was
quoted as saying “we have released some examples of successes but there are intelligence
and other issues involved. There are reasons why, when information has been
clandestinely acquired, are protected from public disclosure. Depending on the
circumstances of the interdiction, various people will know, or may not know” 42
While ambiguity on its success rate continues to weaken the PSI‟s earlier
approval, other issues such as those relating to the nature of membership and lack of
clarity on who constitutes its actual participants exactly only serve to worsen its
diminishing grandeur. During the fifth anniversary celebrations, the US affirmed that the
number of participants rose from 86 to 91 between 2007 and 2008 and that 91
participating states have endorsed the Statement of Interdiction Principles.43 Cynics of the
initiative as usual contest these figures for many reasons. They noted that though
participating states are required to demonstrate their commitment to the initiative by
publicly endorsing the Principles through a public note accompanied by a public
41
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statement of support and also to sign the Ship Boarding Agreements, all the participants
have not done so. In fact, they affirm that only the first group of around 20 members has
and only a handful of countries are known to have signed the Ship Boarding Agreements
with the United States.44 A vast majority of other declared participants are said to have
stated their support but their status on endorsing the Principles and signing Boarding
Agreements are vague. The data according to critics provided by the State Department‟s
website does not corroborate Washington‟s claim that 91 countries have endorsed the
Interdiction Principles so it is still uncertain what level of support majority of other
declared participants have given to the initiative.45 In sum, it makes a lot of sense to
propose that the successes and benefits of the initiative cannot be quantitatively assessed
due to the secret nature of PSI operations.46

Non-Participation
The question of participation is of utmost importance to the PSI. Russia on the
occasion of the PSI‟s first anniversary expressed its willingness to participate in the PSI,
a decision that U.S. officials had supported as an important step in augmenting the
effectiveness of the initiative. However, Russia‟s participation will only occur, according
to the Russian Foreign Ministry, as long as PSI activities do not violate national or
international law. Russian officials have similarly expressed concerns that the PSI‟s land,
sea, and air-based WMD interdiction activities could endanger international commerce.
Russia‟s Ministry of Foreign Affairs had stated unequivocally in June 2004, “We
presume that activity under this initiative should not and will not create any obstacles to
44
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lawful economic, scientific, and technological cooperation of states.”47 Russia‟s
reservations are symptomatic of a much larger set of apprehensions and uncertainties that
have rightfully stirred doubts that the PSI will indeed contribute to nonproliferation goals
without undermining international peace and cooperation.
China in the same vein remains opposed to the initiative as a result of concerns
that it may contravene international legal obligations or produce other undesirable
outcomes. Zhang Qiyue, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman in a Feb, 2004 press
conference reiterates China‟s position on the problem of proliferation being addressed
“through political and diplomatic means within the framework of international laws, and
all nonproliferation measures contributing to the peace, security and stability in the
region and world at large.”48
Despite Beijing‟s opposition towards the initiative, then Undersecretary of State
John Bolton suggested at the time that China is more open to cooperation in weapons
interdiction activities than it will publicly acknowledge. However, as of November 2008,
the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USSC) in its
annual report to Congress contends that “China still has not joined the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI) five years after its inception”.49 Besides China, support for PSI in
other parts of Asia, which are areas of proliferation concern is very weak. In spite of
significant pressure on the part of the US to participate fully and publicly, other key
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countries such as India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan and South Korea remain outside
the coalition of the willing 50
There were in attendance at the fifth anniversary of PSI officials from 21 nonparticipants, including China, India and Pakistan who have questioned the legality of
interdictions and the initiative itself despite assurances from participants that all activities
are consistent with international law. It is not exactly clear why these non-participants
attended the ceremony even though they have kept their distance from the initiative.
China is of particular interest because not only has it evinced concerns about the legality
of interdictions it is also worried that the PSI could be used as a tool by the US to build
an international coalition it controls.
For Russell, “current US counter proliferation policy is not actually focused on
regional security at all. Perhaps more accurately, it subsumes regional security under a
grander global vision of spreading liberal democracy and preventing the rise of a strategic
competitor, whether that competition is defined technologically, militarily, or
ideologically.”51 He further argues that “only WMD, and especially nuclear weapons can
pose a traditional, cross-border, interstate strategic threat to the United States‟ preeminent
position within the global system. Implicitly, if not explicitly, it is this global
preeminence (political/ideological as well as military terms) that the Bush administration
is defending. ”52 So Chinese hesitation may not be only be due to the issues with legality
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of interdictions but could stem from seeing the initiative as yet another unilateral move
by the US to carry other nations along in pursuit of its interest.
The fact still remain that PSI managers are nevertheless still focusing their
energies on roping in the two Asian giants - China and India into the initiative. Their
absence no doubt has heavily impeded the initiative‟s cause in the Asian region.
According to Kumar, China is believed to be “averse to any external policing in its
neighborhood and littoral and is apprehensive about a US led counter proliferation
initiative monitoring its nuclear activities in its backyard, especially given its history of
supporting proliferation involving Pakistan and North Korea.”53 Russell again, tends to
buy this because in his assessment of the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United
States, he conceived that “one sees the cooperation between great powers that it posits is
not based on straight forward multi-polarity involving a combined Chinese-European
definition of the global order alongside the United States as equal partners, but rather on a
presumed US leadership role in which both Europe and China are expected to agree with
the US duty, obligation and responsibility to create global peace through spreading
liberalization…”54
Russell proceeded to conclude that the strategy described above, “places the issue
of competition with potential great powers such as China in ‟China‟s court”55 and that the
“question is not whether the United States will give up its superior military programs and
doctrines-it most certainly will not-but rather whether China will stop competing with the
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United States and accept the US definition of global order.”56 This sounds like a
plausible argument. This is because on close examination of the foundation, structure,
and how the PSI is designed to operate, one wonders if the Chinese reluctance may be
motivated by inclination to compete with the US rather than be a subordinate partner
when it comes to global issues that call for international coalition. China obviously
perceives the PSI as a US originated and controlled nonproliferation tool and is probably
apprehensive of being subjected to the latter‟s whims as a member of PSI. We are yet to
know if the presence of China and the other two nations at the 2008 anniversary signify
an inclination to reconsider their position on the PSI.

Legality of Interdictions
Earlier in this study, the correlation that exists between the legality of
interdictions and the question of participation especially on the part of China was cited. A
crucial point raised by opponents of the PSI, led by China of course, is that the initiative
is restrained by its weak legal basis for military interdiction even while its managers
suggest participants would perform such actions within the domain of their individual
national legal authorities and international legal frameworks. It is true that many legal
hurdles exist which make it unlikely that PSI interdiction operations will approach the
level of efficacy predicted by Bolton in curtailing illicit WMD transfers by states,
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terrorists and other non state actors.57 For instance, in the context of the use of national
military and law enforcement assets to stop, search, and seize seaborne shipments,
experts and national officials alike have pointed out the limitations facing PSI countries.
The legal situation is complex, but in general, whereas states wield significant powers
under international law to stop and seize cargo within their own territory, including in
internal waters, this authority diminishes in a state‟s territorial sea, and is virtually
nonexistent on the high seas. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
guarantees rights to free navigation and innocent passage which ensure vessels
undisturbed free movement through the seas; foreign naval forces or coast guard
authorities may only stop and search a flagged ship on the high seas in specific, narrowly
defined circumstances.58
Prosser and Scoville primarily submit that “where a suspected WMD cargo is
transported under the flag of a foreign state that does not wish to grant PSI member
countries permission to board its ship, PSI participants will usually not have the authority
to act. Similar legal obstacles exist for airborne cargo and shipments traveling through
another state‟s land territory, which is inviolable as a matter of state sovereignty, a
principle enshrined in customary law and in the UN Charter.”59 This challenge is quite
major taking into consideration the odds that every country with a potential proliferation
channel may not be part of or keen in cooperating with the PSI.
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Yet one can dispute that Resolution 1540 requires all member states of the UN
whether affiliated to the PSI or not to criminalize and enforce measures against the
proliferation of WMD, even so, the mandate did not direct states to do so under the
auspices of the PSI. Merely expecting states to abide by UNSCR 1540 is not enough
since there is no effective system for monitoring both compliance and enforcement by
member states on one hand or ensuring that PSI actions conform to the provisions of
UNSCR 1540 on the other hand. There is the question of not only who should monitor
implementation but also how to guarantee that the monitoring process is thorough and
independent. The absence of this provision is a big lapse in UNSCR 1540. PSI
declarations or its Statement of Interdiction Principles in the same vein leaves
ambiguous its decision –making apparatus, in other words who decides when and how to
act, what exactly the role of the US is or if the decision making process remains entirely
ad hoc.
The PSI professes not to target any states in particular yet its Statement of
Interdiction Principles directs attention to “states of concern”. This is a contradiction
because the PSI claim not to target any specific nation while at the same time preventing
proliferation to or from “states of concern”. This sort of ambiguity and the evident
discretion it calls questions PSI‟s conformity to the rule of law. It is also not clear how
PSI participants would act if faced with information indicating that a shipment originated
in a state that is neither a party to the NPT, nor a long-standing nuclear power. Israel,
India, Pakistan and North Korea fall into this category. Speaking of Pakistan and North
Korea as case studies, the US does not appear to be as worried about Pakistan‟s inability
to halt the export of WMD as it is worried about North Korea. This is not to suggest
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necessarily that the US grants a free ride to Pakistan but nuclear nonproliferation expert
Gary Milhollin is more assertive when he notes that “it seems bizarre that we are letting
the Pakistani get away with nuclear smuggling because we think they‟ll help fight
terrorism.”60 For now, the PSI does not have enough support to halt proliferation from all
countries, including those that are powerful or that have special influence as allies in the
global struggle against terrorism but granting free passes to oneself or ones friends runs
contrary to the basic principles of the rule of law. It sets the grantor and the grantee above
the law.
The law presently does not bar any state that is not obligated under the provisions
of an international treaty such as the NPT from transporting weapons of mass destruction
cargoes and North Korea understands this. Hence it “announced its withdrawal from the
NPT on January 10, 2003, stating then that its withdrawal "will come into force
automatically and immediately…”61 North korea regards its withdrawal as
rationalization for its actions when it “kicked out IAEA inspectors, restarted a nuclear
reactor that had been frozen under the 1994 Agreed Framework, and reportedly begun
moving spent fuel rods to a reprocessing facility that can produce plutonium.”62 It is not
too difficult to decipher that North Korea does not want to be bound by the provisions of
the NPT or any treaty that would restrict its motives regarding WMD both on land and in
international waters. This is because seizing missile shipments which are not being
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transported in violation of an international treaty would be highly contentious while
boarding a foreign ship without permission in breach of international law would be
conventionally considered an act of war. Both the UNSCR 1540 and PSI‟s Statement of
Interdiction Principles failed to envisage and adequately address this possibility and
North Korea was quick to exploit this anomaly.
Prosser and Scoville believe that “bilateral boarding agreements may help to
increase the probability that PSI participants will be able to stop and search a given ship‟s
cargo, but such agreements are currently the exception to the rule, and it remains unlikely
that states of “concern” to PSI countries will allow their ships to be boarded.”63 However,
the situation may not be absolutely hopeless because PSI participants and some
supporters of the initiative have argued that in certain cases, interdictions that could
otherwise be deemed illegal may be authorized legally. UNSCR 1540, for instance, as
cited on page 13 of this thesis obliges all states to “,…adopt and enforce appropriate
effective laws which prohibits any non-state actor to …use WMD in particular for
terrorist purposes…and take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic
controls to prevent the proliferation of WMD…by developing security, physical
protection, border and export controls”64 The above clause in UNSCR 1540 appears to
legalize any interdiction of transfer of WMD perpetrated by terrorists or non-state actors
but the burden of proof that such shipments are for purposes of terrorism lies on the PSI.
On the other hand, any interdiction of WMD under the operation of the PSI but
not precisely authorized by United Nations Security Council would possess a weak or
disputable legal foundation, and could jeopardize the much coveted harmony needed
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among PSI states to effectively execute an interdiction exercise. In concluding this
discussion on the legality of interdictions, it is easy to observe that there is no guarantee
that the PSI will utterly prevent the secret transfer of WMD by terrorists, non-state actors
or other smugglers. Even if this is possible, it would require a lot more than within the
capabilities of the initiative for the time being. There might be tremendous improvement
in PSI operations eventually, but chances are that “states and non-state proliferators
would simply devise new methods and patterns of operation to exploit the manifold legal
gaps which restrict the PSI‟s reach.”65 As such, Prosser and Scoville advise that “such
prospects lend themselves to the need for sensible augmentation of current national and
international legal frameworks to criminalize WMD trafficking and enhancement of law
enforcement capabilities.”66

Operational Challenges
Besides legal challenges facing the PSI, other impediments the initiative may face
relate to possible operational weaknesses that may hinder the success of an interdiction
process. These limitations are prevalent, first, in matters of intelligence and information
sharing among PSI participants, and second, in planning and executing coalition
operations. Most of PSI decisions before interdiction are influenced by intelligence.
Warden suggests that “accurate intelligence allows PSI participants to deter or defend
against known proliferators and terrorist threats,… is the key to developing effective
counter and non-proliferation policies and capabilities…emphasis on improving
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intelligence regarding WMD-related facilities and activities, proliferation markets, and
means of transit is crucial to the mission of the PSI”.67
The participant of PSI especially the Operational Experts Group possesses the
wherewithal militarily to defy proliferators but depends on reliable intelligence to supply
the necessary information needed for an interdiction to be successful. The tendency to
collect accurate and reliable intelligence may be hampered by problems associated with
coordination and cooperation due to the fact that member nations of the PSI may possess
different rules, objectives, different sources and methods, and different standards
regarding the quality of information they collect. Again, there may be rules governing
intelligence gathering, for example, intelligence gathering generally involves activity
abroad that is illicit or undertaken with the host government‟s covert cooperation. PSI
nations sharing information among themselves may have different expectations with
regard to the information they gather. This tendency in turn may likely affect swift and
timely decisions that are vital to the success of an interdiction process.
The credibility of the PSI is also enhanced by reliable intelligence and eliminates
misconceptions towards the PSI or its real intention on the part of its antagonists and the
world community at large. When it comes to the integrity of intelligence, the PSI is
exposed to inadequacies in data collection, sharing, trusting and the resultant decision and
action. Acting on a flawed intelligence may lead to a colossal and regrettable outcome.
The disastrous effects of flawed intelligence could not have been felt any more than in
the Iraqi debacle. This resulted in the loss of credibility on the part of the US before the
international community. Even the Bush administration publicly acknowledged at the
time that the intelligence used in prosecuting the war was profoundly flawed. More
67
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blunders of this nature, perhaps from the US-led PSI would not improve America‟s
standing before the world but only lead to even greater loss of integrity by the US.
The Iraqi problem should thus serve as an eye opener to US policy makers and even
more importantly PSI decision-making apparatus that the significance of reliable
intelligence in carrying out PSI interdiction exercises need not be over-emphasized.
Warden contends that “the PSI partners should expect a high level of information
sharing within intelligence agencies of established core members. An initiative sold
internationally as a multilateral approach to WMD trafficking, to include established
information sharing guidelines, must include the best each member‟s intelligence assets
have to offer. An intelligence assessment offered to PSI decision-makers should be
expected to be a product of shared information between all parties involved in the
planned interdiction. PSI interdiction failures due to lack of sharing cannot be
tolerated”.68 The PSI‟s method of gathering, managing and using intelligence would
enhance or jeopardize interdiction operations.
Language barrier is a possible hindrance to the ability of the various nations that
constitute the PSI to efficiently communicate or carry out operations. Highly classified
and tactical information, for instance, in the form of orders may be required to pass
within and across national and language boundaries through operational and strategic
levels of command including governmental and non-governmental organizations. Hence
there is reasonable probability that interdicting partners may have to contend with
anomalies prevalent in transmitting information through interpretation.
Even ardent supporters of the initiative have identified the complexity involved in
planning coalition and alliance operations in circumstances not only difficult to foretell
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but occur at short notice. This stems from international differences in tactics and
procedure for stopping, searching and seizing weapons of mass destruction. Although the
PSI may possess the ability to bring countries together into a cooperative interdiction
operation, the endeavor to a large extent tends to be ad hoc. Countries participating in PSI
do not have standing forces designated PSI forces but only make use of their regular
military, naval, air forces not excluding customs officials who are supposed to have taken
part in PSI training exercises. Since the parties involved in these training exercises are
subject to change, there is no guarantee that the parties who may be drafted to undertake
an ad hoc interdiction in a real life scenario might have been part of the training
exercises.
Finally, aviation experts who have been closely observing PSI exercises have
noted that the choices of a host nation that suspects a defiant aircraft of carrying WMD
may either be to allow or refuse passage, escort through landing or shoot-down. A likely
decision to shoot-down according to them even with accurate intelligence could lead to a
perilous outcome. At Washington‟s request in August 2008, a North Korean plane
suspected of transporting missile –related materials was blocked from flying over Indian
airspace by India air-traffic controllers. According to the Wall Street Journal, “neither the
White House nor the Indian prime minister's office would comment on the operation or
describe the cargo believed to be aboard the plane. But officials familiar with the matter
said the move was part of the Bush administration's Proliferation Security Initiative,
which aims to block the spread of weapons of mass destruction” 69
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When it comes to air interception of WMD, refusing over-flight permission as in
the case described above seems to be an effective option but chances are that North
Korea could transport the dangerous materials to the intended destination through an
alternate route i.e. through the air space of any country willing to allow it passage or
reluctant to grant Washington‟s request to deny over-flight permission. Force might be
used in a non- complaint maritime boarding or an intercept of a ground vehicle likely in a
controlled environment such as naval blockades, ports or border crossings. This situation
practically provides PSI participants the comfort of thoroughly searching for weapons of
mass destruction while the vessel is stopped or while on- board as well as enough time to
allocate resources to more worrisome areas. On the contrary, the capability of doing same
with air-intercepts is substantially limited if not impracticable.. The PSI„s training
exercises so far, according to close observers lacks a plan to address this possibility.
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_____________ Chapter Four ____________
Building an Effective PSI
Increased Participation
The challenges facing the PSI in the preceding chapter brings attention to what
may be considered the heart of the issue, the possible ways to improve the effectiveness
of the PSI and giving it the kind of power it requires to function properly and achieve the
desired results. According to The Monitor, “the PSI is now becoming a new arms-control
issue of widespread concern in the international community-including in China- for it
would have a broad impact both on international and regional security and international
relations writ large”70.
If executed properly, the PSI‟s pursuit of operational capabilities to actively
prevent illicit WMD shipments could help to fill an existing gap in current international
efforts to stop proliferation. In order to do this, PSI participant countries should rapidly
undertake outreach efforts to countries that do not currently participate in the initiative.
The odds are that non participating countries may become a safe haven for proliferators.
These countries may not be involved in direct proliferation but turning a blind eye to
proliferation activity within their territory is nearly as dangerous as trafficking WMD
itself.
On the other hand, expanding participation to accommodate non participators
imposes on the latter the obligation to support PSI measures against the spread of WMD.
Hence the PSI by so doing is indeed closing up the weak links that otherwise may work
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against it. In addition, broadening the coalition would only improve the initiative‟s
efficacy as well as enhance the advancement of rules so vital for its future recognition as
completely legitimate. Participation will naturally continue to expand as more states
perceive the PSI as legitimate and this expansion would further tighten what would have
been loose ends in the non-proliferation network. The more the loose ends are tightened,
the narrower the operational horizon of proliferators becomes and the closer the initiative
gets to achieving its goals.
While the United States has attempted to obtain China‟s support, Chinese
nonparticipation raises serious doubts about PSI‟s efficacy. More so since China is rising
in its ranks as not only a dominant force both political and economically in the Asian
region but also in the global arena. TakehikoYamamoto, a Japanese author and professor
at Waseda University specifically pointed out that Japan as an Asian nation and a
committed member of the PSI can do more to encourage Chinese participation.
According to him, “the Japanese government will need to work hard to persuade China to
formally join …the PSI primarily because China has become one of the major suppliers
of WMD-related dual use goods and technologies”71
China‟s participation would no doubt take the fight against proliferation
especially in Asia to greater heights. Yamamoto, still referring to China further asserts
that “if and when she became a formal member of the PSI, there would no longer be any
question whether Chinese ships carrying WMD-related goods to North Korea could be
boarded and searched in international waters. It seems to me that the time to urge China
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to participate in the PSI is ripe.”72 He concluded that “China‟s desire to burnish its
reputation as a responsible power in the Asia-Pacific region could ultimately translate
into support for the Proliferation Security Initiative, Tokyo should exert itself to bring
that about”73
The PSI should make its activities very transparent as this would not only increase
the perceived legitimacy of the initiative, but likely to dismiss concerns among nonmembers, while encouraging countries that have already agreed to support PSI efforts to
do so more reliably. One might be inclined to wonder why there is so much emphasis on
increasing the participation in the PSI when it looks like it is struggling to effectively
coordinate its activities among its current members. This implies that there is a chance
increasing participation, may consequently increase the laxity the PSI has been accused
of showing in executing its operations mainly when it comes to operational challenges.
Yet, it could be argued that the likelihood of this happening is far-fetched if attempts are
made to address these challenges successfully. It is better to err on the side of increasing
participation while maximizing efforts to deal with impediments that may hinder the
proficiency with which the PSI is expected to operate.

Unquestionable Legitimacy
It is of utmost importance that PSI interdictions of sea, air, and land-based WMD
shipments not emasculate the spirit of the law. Nikitin, analyst in WMD
Nonproliferation, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division affirms that the “United
States should work more aggressively to expand international legal authority for
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interdictions on the high seas and in international airspace”74 A likely step according to
her “would be adoption of a UN Charter, which allows the Security Council to authorize
sanctions or the use of force to compel states to comply with the resolutions”.75
Conversely, there are differing opinions on the above proposal but a school of thought
specifically attempted to bring to light the intricacies surrounding the implementation of
Nikitin‟s proposal.
This school of thought argued that “ a generic UNSC resolution authorizing PSI
actions would appear an improbable and imprudent option in light of the numerous
uncertainties that still surround the PSI: On the basis of what intelligence would
authorizations occur? Who would be charged with deciding, within a sufficiently short
time frame, whether interdiction is warranted in a given case? What specific items would
merit confiscation?”76 It maintained that “such a resolution would give unprecedented
powers to states to act under poorly represented circumstances. Instead, PSI states might
conceive of a proposal to create a UN Security Council committee to rapidly assess the
facts of specific cases for interdiction and offer recommendations to the Security Council
regarding authorizations for individual interdictions.”77 Another option according to this
school is to create an additional UN international body to carry out a similar purpose, and
to promote efficient procedures for timely authorization when needed. Furthermore,
“boarding agreements which streamline procedures and permission-granting for boarding
suspect foreign vessels should be concluded wherever possible among PSI countries, and
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between PSI participants and supporting countries.”78 The PSI is believed to have
concluded several boarding agreements overtime.
The PSI must not completely displace other nonproliferation measures as it would
not be wise to focus solely on interdiction efforts as the principal tool for eradicating the
deadly trade in WMD. Interdiction works well at the tactical level but non-proliferation
treaties tend to address the underlying causes of proliferation. Thus, strengthening of the
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), as well as the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC) and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) should be a priority. States should
not be able to exit these treaties; independent verification and monitoring efforts should
be redoubled.79 If the PSI , for example, determines that a country is violating its
obligations under the Non-proliferation Treaty, it could refer the issue to the United
Nations to impose sanctions as necessary. This will improve the legitimacy of the PSI.
All in all, regardless of how it is instituted, unambiguous proof that PSI operations will
be consistent with the law would to a large extent diminish fear and skepticism on the
part of critics and non participants alike regarding PSI‟s real intentions.

Reliable Intelligence
Accurate intelligence is fundamental to the success of an interdiction exercise.
PSI members can only work as a team, achieve positive results and gain the approval of
the international community when they can furnish unprejudiced and credible intelligence
information regarding the facts of specific threats. According to Ru‟an and Qinghai,
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“history tells us that intelligence- even from the world‟s most powerful country, which
boasts enormous intelligence capabilities – is not always reliable.”80 A lot of effort need
to be put in by PSI to ensure that intelligence is dependable because it is major in
ascertaining what actors or materials represent threats as well as the means being used to
transfer illicit WMD. A demonstration of this ability helps clear doubts on the part of
reluctant PSI partners, may have exposed states clandestine weapon‟s activities while at
the same time providing the opportunity for the PSI to encourage them to give up or
restructure their weapons program.
The issue, therefore, is how to improve intelligence and information –sharing in
the PSI. Prosser and Scoville suggest that “the intelligence-sharing component of the PSI
should be its focus. Participant countries should not merely rest upon existing national
collection and analysis capacities, but would gain more credibility if efforts were pursued
to create an independent intelligence capability. Such capabilities have been discussed for
years in the perspective of the IAEA. Interagency expert meetings involving PSI, IAEA,
the UN Office of Drugs and Crime, Interpol and non-governmental representatives could
help create new ideas and develop synergy in this regard.”81 Creating an independent
intelligence capability would entail developing an intelligence sharing structure akin to
an information network among PSI members, in other words adopting a decentralized
approach to information sharing.
A trusted information network would enhance information gathering possibilities
through a combination of available technical data and human intelligence from PSI
collectors all over the world, encourage a high degree of intelligence sharing among PSI
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members and would spontaneously build trust in the intelligence shared through it. This
network would also be a vital part of PSI exercises and training so as to allow PSI
members have a consistent mechanism for sharing intelligence. For this information
network to be effective, a governing body that would be responsible for the planning,
resources and enforcement of information sharing guidelines should be instituted. There
should be means to deal with violations of established information-sharing procedures
strictly and in a timely manner, including removal from the network. This will further
enhance trust in the network.
While working towards building a totally independent capability, the PSI can
take full advantage of the already existing intelligence sharing structure of an
organization like NATO. After the Sept 11 terrorist attacks,, NATO leaders in a bid to
boost the Alliance‟s anti-terrorism efforts met and agreed to improve intelligence
sharing and to develop new hi-tech defenses against terrorist attacks. NATO allies
decided to create a permanent Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit at NATO headquarters in
Brussels to analyze general terrorist threats as well as those specifically aimed at NATO.
According to a post Sept 11 Commission report, “The PSI can be more effective if it uses
intelligence and planning resources of the NATO alliance”82. This is practicable,
nevertheless, it is necessary to note that all PSI partners are not members of NATO. As a
result, a NATO-structure for intelligence sharing with PSI partners that are non-members
of NATO, for instance, Russia, would likely require acceptance into the network or
additions to the NATO alliance.. .
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Finally, it is necessary to point out that the value of intelligence is undermined by
“assumptions used to gather it, preferences of people using it, and the complexity of the
information itself. Taking these limitations into account, PSI participants should not
expect actionable intelligence for every conceivable WMD shipment. What can be
expected are improvements to the current system, reliable assessment of intelligence
accuracy, and robust intelligence sharing among PSI core members.”83 Assembling and
providing specialized training to professionals drawn from different levels of law
enforcement based on their background and broad experiences in intelligence issues and
information technology will go a long way in improving the ability to gather, analyze,
protect and share credible and timely information to prevent or at least deter proliferation
of WMD. It will be difficult to augment intelligence sharing without having a common
understanding of the goals of an intelligence process. This would take time and effort on
the part of PSI but would produce better results.. Improved intelligence competence is
indispensable to the PSI and beyond monitoring WMD, will also be helpful in fighting
illicit trade in convention weapons, narcotics, human trafficking and other nefarious
activities.

Revamped Framework
For the PSI to accomplish its desired goals and gain international approval, it
needs a more concrete institutional structure. A solid institutional structure would give
the PSI decision-making capabilities that are distinguishable from national authorities and
allow the PSI to approach the proliferation problem with a more unified and consistent
83
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strategy.84. An immediate and effective approach would be to merge the PSI with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) regimes. This merger provides the PSI the institutional structure that is lacking in
the PSI. In this case, the administrative structure of the IAEA which will be overhauled in
itself as a result of this blend will govern the PSI. It will also serve as the channel through
which actions undertaken under the umbrella of the PSI would be scrutinized by external
players such as intergovernmental organizations, national parliaments and civil society.
The PSI puts teeth into the IAEA and NPT and also the required force that has
been lacking, rendering these more traditional non-proliferation institutions redundant
over the years. These agencies at the same time afford the PSI the collective legitimacy to
use that force. This is consistent with the first paragraph of the Statement of Interdiction
principles which suggests that the PSI is no more than a new enforcement mechanism to
supplement existing nonproliferation regimes.85 As more international participants are
invited to join the PSI, it becomes imperative to establish in alliance with the IAEA,
command and control systems that can ensure PSI and its allies can communicate and
coordinate operations within agencies that are part of a central network. In this way, the
initiative thus represents an opportunity to bring the use of force and international
legitimacy under a new collective security framework.
A good number of the programs and activities of the IAEA are applicable to the
objectives of UNSCR 1540 presumed to give the PSI its legal backing. Such programs
and activities involve legislative assistance, training state officials, support to states in
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securing nuclear facilities and upgrading border controls among others. These activities
aimed at assisting states in preventing the transfer of nuclear material and related
technologies to non-states actors not only contribute to the implementation of Resolution
1540 by member states of the United Nations but will also complement PSI‟s interdiction
efforts which on its own cannot stop proliferation of WMD. Since the IAEA already has
in place programs that would assist states fulfill the mandate under UNSCR 1540, it
makes sense for the PSI not to override or duplicate the efforts of the IAEA or the NPT
but harness and reinforce their non-proliferation goals.
Bringing the PSI closer to the UN framework enhances support as “a more
formalized structure could solidify states‟ commitments to actively support PSI goals
over time and beyond future government changeovers”86. The UN may be imperfect but
its structures are recognized as legitimate. So uniting PSI with these already existing
nonproliferation agencies of the UN gives more states the opportunity to participate
politically and practically since most of them are already members of the UN. Outside the
UN some developing nations cannot contribute practically to PSI because their armed
forces, coast guards and law enforcement agencies are often weak or in a state of flux.
However under the auspices of the UN, Prosser and Scoville contend that “international
resource-sharing and cooperative training will be stepped up by those countries with
expertise that is desperately needed in countries with poor law enforcement, export and
border controls”87.
Having established the need to tie the PSI to the IAEA, the next logical step would be for
the entire international community to assume responsibility to implement this at the UN.
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The US president in his address at the 64th session of the UN General Assembly last
month pledged to hold a summit in April 2010 that “reaffirms each nation‟s
responsibility to secure nuclear material on its territory, and to help those who can‟t... and
we will work to strengthen the institutions and initiatives that combat nuclear smuggling
and theft.”88 This Summit should discuss a comprehensive agreement on tightening and
unifying the current counter proliferation regime with the PSI under a new framework.
The challenge of nuclear proliferation is constantly changing and evolving as
proliferators devise means to succeed in spreading WMD hence the need to constantly
update counter proliferation measures. Re-structuring the framework of the PSI will bring
greater results than letting the PSI continue to operate as a loose arrangement of a group
of like-minded countries that share similar counter-proliferation goals.

.
Funding
The issue of funding is indispensable in keeping the initiative active. If the PSI is
to be genuinely relied upon as a tool to stem WMD proliferation, then it should be funded
accordingly. America could set an example to other nations by ensuring one of its most
highly celebrated nonproliferation efforts is adequately and constantly funded. Sources
from Arms Control Association referring to the immediate past government alleged “the
administration made the PSI a key foreign policy and defense goal in 2005 and Congress
approved $50 million to help states support the initiative”.89 . This sum is insufficient
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compared to the enormity of the task required to effectively check the spread of nuclear
weapons.
Alex Reed noted that, “for fiscal year 2008, the National Security Administrations
budget request for traditional Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A)
programs that secure nuclear material at its source is approximately $250 million, a rather
piddling amount considering its importance to national security. According to
Congressional Research Service Estimates, $250million would not be enough to fund
even a single day of the Iraq War, which was initiated to stop the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction. If stemming the spread of WMDs is truly a high priority for
the US Government, significantly greater funding is needed to secure materials at their
source”.90
Reed is right about the issue of funding the PSI depending on the current
administration‟s stand on the PSI. Prior to his election, President Obama in a response to
a presidential questionnaire by Arms Control Today on non-proliferation issues proposed
an expansion of the Proliferation Security Initiative from its current focus on stopping
illicit nuclear shipments to eradicating nuclear black market networks, like the remnants
of the (notorious Pakistani scientist) Abdul Qadeer Khan organization.91 In a speech
delivered in the Czech Republic in April this year, he also reiterated his intension to
“boost support for the nation's Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to
Combat Nuclear Terrorism to make them into durable international institutions".92 The
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President‟s remarks underscores high-level support for the PSI, however what actually
determines that the PSI is of high priority to the US is practically funding the initiative.
After adopting the PSI as a key foreign policy and defense goal, Congress should
subsequently approve adequate funding for PSI to pursue its cause. The planning,
coordination, and implementation of the objectives of the PSI should be consolidated into
one office at the State Department with a budget that is commensurate with the threat
posed by nuclear weapons. Each fiscal year in which activities are planned to be carried
out under the PSI, the President shall include in the budget request for each participating
United States Government agency or department for that fiscal year, a description of the
funding and the activities for which the funding is requested for each such agency or
department. Other nations that are participants of the PSI should also include in their
budgets funds to support PSI as well. Doing this will increase coordination, cooperation,
and compliance among PSI-participating countries and will enhance the initiative‟s
global outlook.
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____________ Chapter Five ____________
The Future of the PSI
Conclusion

The Obama administration has publicly divulged its intention to support the PSI,
but the US can and should do more in terms of consolidating the PSI and building on
what the past administration achieved. The new administration should back up its
statements with actions to increase the momentum with which the PSI first took off. If
the Bush administration had not created the PSI, the Obama administration would still
require to devise a global strategy that may be accompanied with a level of force
analogous to that which the PSI is primarily designed to operate in order to effectively
combat WMD. Since the PSI is already in place, launching an entirely new initiative
would be a sheer waste of time, energy and resources both on the part of the US and other
PSI participants that could have been invested in the present initiative to further
consolidate its base.
A new initiative with a global view would require a totally new arrangement with
solicitation of the support of the same nations who have already pledged their
commitment to the PSI. A situation such as this, on the part of other nations, tend to
provoke the feeling of being subjected to the whims and caprices of every new American
government. This may even lead to further loss of credibility on the part of the US before
the world community. On the other hand, the new administration embracing the PSI
makes for consistency, will do a lot more to improve both the credibility of the initiative
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and that of the US overall before the world community and will inspire more confidence
in the current PSI participants.
Building on the foundation that is already in existence should begin with
implementation of the recommendations discussed in chapter four above. Washington‟s
inability to implement these or find alternative ways to fill up the gaps that are existing in
the PSI would hinder the success of the PSI. As a matter of fact, a good number of
Americans agree that the Obama administration is more popular than the defunct Bush
administration. An integral part of the world community also assign more credibility to
the latter compared to the former. The incumbent administration could exploit the
popularity and credibility advantage to advance the goals of the PSI.
The PSI and the spate of proliferation and terrorism it plans to tackle affects all
countries. So European nations are also faced with the challenge of developing a more
comprehensive and proactive response to new counter proliferation measures. France,
Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and a host of others have traditionally put emphasis
on multilateral means to fight weapons proliferation. So the PSI provides them with the
opportunity to play a more active role in the definition of a new international security
coalition and engage more actively with the US on how renewed multilateralism can
provide an effective and legitimate framework to address global security issues such as
weapons proliferation.
Europe in partnership with the US and within the UN is inclined to use the PSI to
show responsibility on weapons proliferation and global security. The PSI can thus be
described as bridging American and European views on international security. Aside of
US , Japan and Australia, eight out of the initial eleven countries that constitute the PSI
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are European nations and more have endorsed the PSI overtime. This trend underscores
European commitment and resolve towards the aims of the PSI and needs to be sustained.
In the Asia-Pacific region, Japan, Singapore, and Australia are the countries that
most actively participate in the PSI. Australia seeks to take a leading role in regional
security by participating in PSI operations and cooperating with the United States. Japan
and Singapore rely heavily on their numerous harbors for commerce and share the
common interest in preventing dangerous materials from passing through their territorial
seas. China, on the other hand, is not fully ready to take part in the initiative. Much of the
materiel targeted for interdiction under the PSI departs from Chinese harbors. For Beijing
to embrace the PSI, then, would have negative consequences for much of the nation‟s
commercial shipping
Although China is reluctant to aggressively support an initiative that would
require it to monitor and regulate commercial shipping along its lengthy eastern coastline,
China is cooperating with the United States to prevent WMD-related materials from
entering North Korea. In the summer of 2003, China stopped and confiscated a railroad
cargo on its way to North Korea using information provided by the United States,. The
train contained a nuclear-related substance known as liquefied tributyl phosphate (TBP).
Beijing understands the repercussions of a nuclear North Korea for Chinese security and
cooperates with the United States on this matter of common interest. It is already a
member of the Container Security Initiative (CSI), a program introduced by the U.S.
Customs Service to help increase security for containerized cargo shipped to the United
States from around the world. Chinese membership of the CSI further attests to its
cooperative attitude. As a result, a formal acquiescence and support of the PSI in due
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course on the part of China is very likely especially when its reservations about
legitimacy is minimized by closely associating the PSI with the UN.
Allowing the PSI to die or merely letting it exist as yet another toothless bulldog
in the ranks of the NPT and IAEA would be equally catastrophic. The IAEA is only
designed to inspect facilities and submit reports that it lacks the power and authority to
act on. It is the obligation of the broader international community to be more forceful in
acting on these reports or vest the IAEA with the authority to act beyond inspections.
Failure to make sweeping changes to the status quo implicitly suggests that a huge gap
still exists between the imminent dangers posed by WMD juxtaposed with the measures
adopted so far to address the problem. The initiative can indeed play an important role in
helping to curb the hazardous proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as the
means to produce and spread them and will eventually avoid unspeakable destruction,
suffering and death.
Embracing dialogue and international law on the part of the initiative rather than
ignoring it increases the likelihood of attracting wider participation, particularly the much
coveted Chinese membership. The US allowing its friends and allies to circumvent laws
guiding weapons of mass destruction erodes the legitimacy the PSI craves to be more
proficient in fighting WMD. All in all, the PSI is a positive move towards checking the
menace of nuclear proliferation. To do nothing vigorous may be as risky as the imminent
danger posed by WMD. Michael Beck is certainly right that “the Proliferation Security
Initiative is at once the most oversold and the most promising nonproliferation initiative
to emerge in decades.”93
93
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Appendix 1

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)
UNSCR 1540
United Nations S/RES/1540 (2004)
Security Council
Distr.: General
28 April 2004
04-32843 (E)
*0432843*
Resolution 1540 (2004)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4956th meeting,
on 28 April 2004
The Security Council,
Affirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as
well as their means of delivery,* constitutes a threat to international peace and
security,
Reaffirming, in this context, the Statement of its President adopted at the
Council‟s meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government on 31 January
1992 (S/23500), including the need for all Member States to fulfill their obligations
in relation to arms control and disarmament and to prevent proliferation in all its
aspects of all weapons of mass destruction,
Recalling also that the Statement underlined the need for all Member States to
resolve peacefully in accordance with the Charter any problems in that context
threatening or disrupting the maintenance of regional and global stability,
Affirming its resolve to take appropriate and effective actions against any
threat to international peace and security caused by the proliferation of nuclear,
chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery, in conformity with its
primary responsibilities, as provided for in the United Nations Charter,
Affirming its support for the multilateral treaties whose aim is to eliminate or
prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and the
importance for all States parties to these treaties to implement them fully in order to
promote international stability,
______________________________________
* Definitions for the purpose of this resolution only:
Means of delivery: missiles, rockets and other unmanned systems capable of delivering
nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, that are specially designed for such use.
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Non-State actor: individual or entity, not acting under the lawful authority of any State in
conducting activities which come within the scope of this resolution.
Related materials: materials, equipment and technology covered by relevant multilateral
treaties and arrangements, or included on national control lists, which could be used for
the design, development, production or use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons
and their means of delivery.
2
S/RES/1540 (2004)
Welcoming efforts in this context by multilateral arrangements which
contribute to non-proliferation,
Affirming that prevention of proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons should not hamper international cooperation in materials, equipment and
technology for peaceful purposes while goals of peaceful utilization should not be
used as a cover for proliferation,
Gravely concerned by the threat of terrorism and the risk that non-State
actors* such as those identified in the United Nations list established and
maintained by the Committee established under Security Council resolution 1267
and those to whom resolution 1373 applies, may acquire, develop, traffic in or use
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery,
Gravely concerned by the threat of illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical, or
biological weapons and their means of delivery, and related materials,* which adds
a new dimension to the issue of proliferation of such weapons and also poses a
threat to international peace and security,
Recognizing the need to enhance coordination of efforts on national,
Sub regional, regional and international levels in order to strengthen a global
response to this serious challenge and threat to international security,
Recognizing that most States have undertaken binding legal obligations under
treaties to which they are parties, or have made other commitments aimed at
preventing the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, and have
taken effective measures to account for, secure and physically protect sensitive
materials, such as those required by the Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Materials and those recommended by the IAEA Code of Conduct on the
Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources,
Recognizing further the urgent need for all States to take additional effective
measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and
their means of delivery,
Encouraging all Member States to implement fully the disarmament treaties
and agreements to which they are party,
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Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist
acts,
Determined to facilitate henceforth an effective response to global threats in
the area of non-proliferation,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Decides that all States shall refrain from providing any form of support
to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport,
transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery;
2. Decides also that all States, in accordance with their national procedures,
shall adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State
actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear,
chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for
3
S/RES/1540 (2004)
_______________________________
terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engage in any of the foregoing activities,
participate in them as an accomplice, assist or finance them;
3. Decides also that all States shall take and enforce effective measures to
establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or
biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing
appropriate controls over related materials and to this end shall:
(a) Develop and maintain appropriate effective measures to account for and
secure such items in production, use, storage or transport;
(b) Develop and maintain appropriate effective physical protection measures;
(c) Develop and maintain appropriate effective border controls and law
enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent and combat, including through
international cooperation when necessary, the illicit trafficking and brokering in
such items in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and
consistent with international law;
(d) Establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate effective national
export and trans-shipment controls over such items, including appropriate laws and
regulations to control export, transit, trans-shipment and re-export and controls on
providing funds and services related to such export and trans-shipment such as
financing, and transporting that would contribute to proliferation, as well as
establishing end-user controls; and establishing and enforcing appropriate criminal
or civil penalties for violations of such export control laws and regulations;
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4. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of
procedure, for a period of no longer than two years, a Committee of the Security
Council, consisting of all members of the Council, which will, calling as appropriate
on other expertise, report to the Security Council for its examination, on the
implementation of this resolution, and to this end calls upon States to present a first
report no later than six months from the adoption of this resolution to the
Committee on steps they have taken or intend to take to implement this resolution;
5. Decides that none of the obligations set forth in this resolution shall be
interpreted so as to conflict with or alter the rights and obligations of State Parties to
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention or alter the responsibilities of the
International Atomic Energy Agency or the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons;
6. Recognizes the utility in implementing this resolution of effective
national control lists and calls upon all Member States, when necessary, to pursue at
the earliest opportunity the development of such lists;
7. Recognizes that some States may require assistance in implementing the
provisions of this resolution within their territories and invites States in a position to
do so to offer assistance as appropriate in response to specific requests to the States
lacking the legal and regulatory infrastructure, implementation experience and/or
resources for fulfilling the above provisions;
4
S/RES/1540 (2004)
_________________________________________________
8. Calls upon all States:
(a) To promote the universal adoption and full implementation, and, where
necessary, strengthening of multilateral treaties to which they are parties, whose aim
is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons;
(b) To adopt national rules and regulations, where it has not yet been done,
to ensure compliance with their commitments under the key multilateral nonproliferation
treaties;
(c) To renew and fulfill their commitment to multilateral cooperation, in
particular within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention, as important means of pursuing and achieving their common
objectives in the area of non-proliferation and of promoting international
cooperation for peaceful purposes;

64

(d) To develop appropriate ways to work with and inform industry and the
public regarding their obligations under such laws;
9. Calls upon all States to promote dialogue and cooperation on nonproliferation
so as to address the threat posed by proliferation of nuclear, chemical,
or biological weapons, and their means of delivery;
10. Further to counter that threat, calls upon all States, in accordance with
their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law,
to take cooperative action to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or
biological weapons, their means of delivery, and related materials;
11. Expresses its intention to monitor closely the implementation of this
resolution and, at the appropriate level, to take further decisions which may be
required to this end;
12. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
____________________________________
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Appendix 2

Statement of Interdiction Principles.
Adopted in Paris, 4 September 2003
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a response to the growing challenge posed
by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and
related materials worldwide. The PSI builds on efforts by the international community to
prevent proliferation of such items, including existing treaties and regimes. It is
consistent with and a step in the implementation of the United Nations Security Council
Presidential Statement of January 1992, which states that the proliferation of all WMD
constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and underlines the need for
member states of the U.N. to prevent proliferation. The PSI is also consistent with recent
statements of the G8 and the European Union, establishing that more coherent and
concerted efforts are needed to prevent the proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems,
and related materials. PSI participants are deeply concerned about this threat and of the
danger that these items could fall into the hands of terrorists, and are committed to
working together to stop the flow of these items to and from states and non-state actors of
proliferation concern.
The PSI seeks to involve in some capacity all states that have a stake in nonproliferation
and the ability and willingness to take steps to stop the flow of such items at sea, in the
air, or on land. The PSI also seeks cooperation from any state whose vessels, flags, ports,
territorial waters, airspace, or land might be used for proliferation purposes by states and
non-state actors of proliferation concern. The increasingly aggressive efforts by
proliferators to stand outside or to circumvent existing nonproliferation norms, and to
profit from such trade, requires new and stronger actions by the international community.
We look forward to working with all concerned states on measures they are able and
willing to take in support of the PSI, as outlined in the following set of "Interdiction
Principles."
Interdiction Principles for the Proliferation Security Initiative:
PSI participants are committed to the following interdiction principles to establish a more
coordinated and effective basis through which to impede and stop shipments of WMD,
delivery systems, and related materials flowing to and from states and non-state actors of
proliferation concern, consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international
law and frameworks, including the United Nations Security Council. They call on all
states concerned with this threat to international peace and security to join in similarly
committing to:
1) Undertake effective measures, either alone or in concert with other states, for
interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD, their delivery systems, and related
materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. "States or non-

66
state actors of proliferation concern" generally refers to those countries or entities that the
PSI participants involved establish should be subject to interdiction activities because
they are engaged in proliferation through: (1) efforts to develop or acquire chemical,
biological, or nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems; or (2) transfers (either
selling, receiving, or facilitating) of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials.
2) Adopt streamlined procedures for rapid exchange of relevant information concerning
suspected proliferation activity, protecting the confidential character of classified
information provided by other states as part of this initiative, dedicate appropriate
resources and efforts to interdiction operations and capabilities, and maximize
coordination among participants in interdiction efforts.
3) Review and work to strengthen their relevant national legal authorities where
necessary to accomplish these objectives, and work to strengthen when necessary
relevant international laws and frameworks in appropriate ways to support these
commitments.
4) Take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts regarding cargoes of WMD,
their delivery systems, or related materials, to the extent their national legal authorities
permit and consistent with their obligations under international law and frameworks, to
include:
a) Not to transport or assist in the transport of any such cargoes to or from states or nonstate actors of proliferation concern, and not to allow any persons subject to their
jurisdiction to do so.
b) At their own initiative, or at the request and good cause shown by another state, to take
action to board and search any vessel flying their flag in their internal waters or territorial
seas, or areas beyond the territorial seas of any other state, that is reasonably suspected of
transporting such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concerns,
and to seize such cargoes that are identified.
c) To seriously consider providing consent under the appropriate circumstances to the
boarding and searching of its own flag vessels by other states, and to the seizure of such
WMD-related cargoes in such vessels that may be identified by such states.
d) To take appropriate actions to (1) stop and/or search in their internal waters, territorial
seas, or contiguous zones (when declared) vessels that are reasonably suspected of
carrying such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern and to
seize such cargoes that are identified; and (2) enforce conditions on vessels entering or
leaving their ports, internal waters, or territorial seas that are reasonably suspected of
carrying such cargoes, such as requiring that such vessels be subject to boarding, search,
and seizure of such cargoes prior to entry.
e) At their own initiative or upon the request and good cause shown by another state, to
(a) require aircraft that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from
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states or non-state actors of proliferation concern and that are transiting their airspace to
land for inspection and seize any such cargoes that are identified; and/or (b) deny aircraft
reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes transit rights through their airspace in
advance of such flights.
f) If their ports, airfields, or other facilities are used as transshipment points for shipment
of such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, to inspect
vessels, aircraft, or other modes of transport reasonably suspected of carrying such
cargoes, and to seize such cargoes that are identified.
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